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Abstract 
 
In the context of wage discrimination the effects of a changing population 
composition on wages have been analysed only when labour supplies are fixed. This 
note introduces variable supplies, with labour supply varying at the extensive margin. 
Contrary to the case of fixed labour supplies, we find that wages of the discriminated 
and the non-discriminated group can change in the same direction. The effects on the 
wage ratio however, are in the same direction as in the case of fixed supplies. The 
reason that wage levels can change in the same direction is that in addition to the 
relative labour supply effect, an aggregate labour supply effect can be of the opposite 
sign and dominate the relative labour supply effect.  
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I. Introduction 
If different population groups have different productive characteristics, changes in 
population composition shift aggregate labour supply and wages change accordingly. 
However, changes in population composition can affect wages even when population 
groups have identical productive characteristics, when labour market discrimination is 
present. Becker (1971a, pp. 51-52) was the first to show how wages depend on 
population composition in the presence of employer discrimination. In Becker’s 
analysis, as the population proportion of the discriminated group increases, its wage 
falls and the wage of the non-discriminated group increases, resulting in a larger wage 
differential between the two groups. Becker’s analysis relied on perfectly inelastic 
labour supplies and was therefore more relevant in the short-run. As it becomes 
increasingly recognised that Becker’s models are also relevant in the long run, we 
need to have an understanding of the effects of population composition with variable 
labour supply. Does the elasticity of labour supply matter, or can Becker’s results be 
extended to the long run? These questions bear directly on any analysis of the effects 
of the changing racial and ethnic population composition in the US in the past 30 
years which saw the proportion of non-Hispanic white population falling from 80 
percent in 1980 to 64 percent in 2010 (US Census Bureau, 1995, 2011). This note 
argues that a variable labour supply substantially alters the analysis of the effects of a 
changing population composition in the presence of labour discrimination. With 
variable labour supply, the effects of a changing population composition on relative 
wages have the same direction as in the case of fixed labour supply, but the effects on 
wage levels are different.       
 An early criticism of Becker’s taste-based discrimination models was that they 
were only plausible in the short run because in the long run market forces were 
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expected to drive discriminators out of business (Arrow 1972). Subsequent empirical 
and theoretical work however has shown that these models may be applicable over 
longer periods of time. Goldberg (1982) showed that with employer discrimination 
modelled as additional utility derived from hiring a specific type of worker (referred 
to as nepotism), discriminating employers would not be driven out of business 
because the asking price for their capital would be too high for those with no 
discriminatory preferences. Charles and Guryan (2007) argue that prejudiced 
employers can stay in business in the long run when prejudice is modelled as portable 
across economic roles. The empirical analysis of Charles and Guryan (2008), 
covering the period 1972-2004, confirmed the Becker model prediction that wage 
differentials would vary with the preferences of the marginal employer and showed 
that a large part of state level black-white wage differentials is explained by 
differences in prejudices. Flabbi (2010) found that discriminatory preferences toward 
women in the US are more resilient than previously thought.       
 In this note we closely follow Goldberg’s (1982) articulation of Becker’s 
(1971a) employer discrimination model and allow labour supply to vary at the 
extensive margin, i.e. participation into employment. The focus on the extensive 
margin is empirically relevant and theoretically convenient. Unlike its effect on hours, 
the effect of wages on participation can be confidently assumed monotonic. Moreover 
it is widely accepted that the labour supply responsiveness at the extensive margin 
dominates that of the intensive margin (Heckman 1993, p. 117; Cahuc and Zylberberg 
2004, p. 38). 
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II. The model  
Consider two types of workers, M and F, with identical productive capacity.  
Employers dislike employing workers of type F, with this distaste expressed as 
follows. When the market wage for the F workers is wF, employers value it as 
(1 )F Fd w  with 0Fd  . The term dF is Becker’s discrimination coefficient (Becker, 
1971a, p.14). Following Becker (1971b, p. 71, n. 4), employers’ preferences are 
expressed as: 
 
F F FU d w L        (1) 
 
Where   denotes profits and LF the level of employment of F workers. The 
employers’ problem is to maximise utility subject to:  
 
( ) ( )M FQ f L f L L         (2) 
( )F F M MQ w L w L          (3) 
 
Where the price of output is taken as the numeraire and 0f   , 0f   . From the first 
order conditions we have: 
 
Mf w    if 0ML  , and  
Mf w    if 0ML       (4) 
 
 
(1 )F Ff w d    if 0FL  , and  
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(1 )F Ff w d    if 0FL       (5) 
 
Conditions (4) and (5) imply that in a competitive labour market with a continuous 
distribution of dF across employers and for a given set of wages for M and F, a firm 
will hire either only M or only F workers. If an employer’s dF is such that 
(1 )M F Fw w d  , the relative market wage differential between M and F is higher 
than this employer’s discrimination coefficient, which implies that the F workers are 
relatively cheaper and therefore the firm workforce will be all F. For such a firm the 
marginal cost of hiring F workers is always below the marginal cost of hiring M 
workers so only F workers are hired. Similarly, if an employer’s dF is such that 
(1 )M F Fw w d  , then only M workers are hired. 
 If dF has a density ( )Fh d , then 
1
1F
X
d


 has a density ( )g x  which, in 
principle, can be derived from ( )Fh d  (see Goldberg (1982), p. 310). Suppose 
individuals either work or not, and if they do, they work a fixed number of hours. If 
the cumulative distribution function of reservation wages of group k is given by 
( )k kS w , k = F, M, then ( )k kS w  is the employment rate of group k at wage wk. The 
equilibrium wages of groups F, M are determined by:  
 
/
0
( ) ( ) ( )
F Mw w
M M M Mp S w R w g x dx       (6) 
 
1
/
( ) ( ) ( )
F M
F
F F F
w w
w
p S w R g x dx
x
       (7) 
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Where pk is the population proportion of group k, k = F, M, 
1( ) [ ] ( )R f     is a firm’s 
labour demand, and the mass of workers and firms are both equal to one.     
 Equations (6) and (7) indicate that the F/M wage ratio regulates the clearing of 
the markets for each group. In equilibrium the aggregate supply of M workers equals 
the sum of the demands of those firms with F
M
w
x
w
 . The aggregate supply of the F 
workers equals the sum of the demands of those firms with F
M
w
x
w
 . The general 
economic problem is the simultaneous clearing of the markets for two inputs which 
are imperfect substitutes, with the degree of substitutability variable at the firm level.  
Goldberg (1982) discusses how firm size varies with discrimination 
preferences, and Becker (1971) analyses how equilibrium wages change as the 
population proportions of the two groups change when labour supplies are perfectly 
inelastic.    
 
III Analysis 
To analyse how wages change as population proportions change keeping total 
population constant, we totally differentiate (6) and (7) with respect to pM and solve 
for M
M
dw
dp
 and F
M
dw
dp
 (see Appendix for details). We obtain: 
 
1 6 3 4
5 3 2 6
F
M
A A A Adw
dp A A A A



      (8.1) 
 
1 5 2 4
5 3 2 6
M
M
A A A Adw
dp A A A A



      (8.2) 
 8 
 
Where: 
1 ( )M MA S w  
2
( )
( )M F
M M
R w w
A g
w w
   
/
3 2
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F Mw w
F F
M M M M M
M M
w w
A R w g x dx p S w R w g
w w
      
4 ( )F FA S w  
1
5
/
1 1
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F M
F F
M F F M
M Mw w
w w
A p S w R g x dx R w g
x x w w
      
6 2
( ) ( )F FM
M M
w w
A R w g
w w
  
 
The denominator in (8.1) and (8.2) can be re-arranged as: 
 
1
/
/
0
1
2
/
1 1
[(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
1
[(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ] ( ) ( )
F M
F M
F M
F F
M F F M
M Mw w
w w
M M M M
F F F
M F F M
M Mw w
w w
p S w R g x dx R w g
x x w w
R w g x dx p S w
w w w
p S w R g x dx R w g
x x w w
    
    
    



 
 
Both terms of this expression are negative as long as ( ) 0R    and ( ) 0S   . ( ) 0R    
follows from 1( ) [ ] ( )R f     and 0f   . ( ) 0S    is true as long as ( )S   is a 
differentiable cdf. 
The signs of these derivatives therefore depend on their numerators. The numerator of 
(8.1) can be re-arranged as: 
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/
2
0
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
F Mw w
F F F F M M
M M M M M
M M F F
w w S w S w
R w g x dx p S w R w g
w w S w

      
 
The sign of this expression is ambiguous. The first two terms are negative but the sign 
of the last term depends on the relative employment rates of the two groups. If 
( ) ( )F F M MS w S w , then 0
F
M
dw
dp
 . But this does not have to be the case. This will 
certainly not be the case if M and F have the same cdf for their reservation wage 
because the M will have a higher wage than the F. But if the two groups have 
different cdfs for their reservation wages, this condition is possible. In particular, it is 
likely that the group that suffers discrimination has lower assets, which could imply 
that at any given wage the F employment rate is higher than the M employment rate. 
Then, if the effect of lower assets is greater than the effect of lower wages, we will 
have ( ) ( )F F M MS w S w .  
 Relative employment rates also matter for the effect of a changing pM on wM. 
The numerator of (8.2) can be re-arranged as: 
   
1
/
( ) ( )1 1
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( )
F M
F F M M F F
M F F M
M M M Mw w
w w S w S w
p S w R g x dx R w g
x x w w S w

     
 
This expression is positive if ( ) ( )M M F FS w S w , i.e. the opposite of what is required 
for 0F
M
dw
dp
 . If ( ) ( )M M F FS w S w  then 0.
M
M
dw
dp
  
 The effects of a changing pM on wages are summarised in Table 1. Since 
1F Mp p  , the effects of a changing Fp  have the opposite sign. These effects are 
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summarised in the last two columns of Table 1. The effects of a changing population 
composition on wage levels that Becker (1971a) derived with perfectly inelastic 
labour supplies are a special case of the analysis above, and can be derived setting 
( ) ( ) 0M FS S     . Note also that the results of Becker’s analysis correspond to the case 
where ( ) ( )M M F FS w S w . 
 
Table 1 
Effects of a changing population proportion on wage levels 
 
 Effects of Mdp  
 
Effects of Fdp  
 
 
 
F
M
dw
dp
 M
M
dw
dp
 F
F
dw
dp
 M
F
dw
dp
 
( ) ( )M M F FS w S w  
 
+ +   or   –   –    +   or   –   
( ) ( )M M F FS w S w  
 
+   or   –    –    +   or   –   +    
( ) ( )M M F FS w S w  
 
+  –   –   + 
 
 
 Turning to the effects of changing population composition on the wage ratio, 
substituting F
M
dw
dp
 and M
M
dw
dp
 from (8.1) and (8.2) we have: 
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2
1 1
( ) [ ]F F F M F F M
M M M M M M M M M M
w dw w dw dw w dwd
dp w w dp w dp w dp w dp
          
1 6 4 3 1 5 2 4
5 3 2 6
1
[ ( )]
( )
F
M M
w
A A A A A A A A
w A A A A w
     

 
 
We have already shown above that 5 3 2 6 0A A A A  . After re-arranging, the term in 
the brackets becomes: 
 
/
0
1
/
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F M
F M
w w
F F M M F F M M
F F F
M M M F F M M
M M w w
S w R w g x dx p S w S w
w w w
p S w S w S w R g x dx
w w x x
   
     


 
 
Given our assumptions this expression is negative, so ( ) 0F
M M
wd
dp w
  and 
( ) 0F
F M
wd
dp w
 . 
 
Compared to fixed labour supplies then, variable labour supplies do not 
preserve the direction of the effects of population composition changes on wage levels 
but preserve the direction of the effects on wage ratios. To understand why it is 
possible (if not likely) for a given change in population composition to change wages 
of the two groups in the same direction, it is important to note how aggregate labour 
supply across both groups changes. When the employment rates of the two groups 
differ, aggregate labour supply increases as the population proportion of the group 
with the higher employment rate increases. As aggregate labour supply increases, it 
depresses the wages of both groups. For example, if ( ) ( )M M F FS w S w  and Mp  
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increases, the M workers become too expensive for the marginal employers. This puts 
downward pressure on the M wage and upward pressure on the F wage. At the same 
time however, aggregate labour supply across both groups increases, depressing the 
wages of both groups. In the case of the M workers both effects are in the same 
direction. In the case of F workers they are not. If for the F workers the aggregate 
labour supply dominates the relative labour supply effect, then their wage will fall, 
just as the M wage falls.  
 
IV Conclusion  
In his analysis of the effects of a changing population composition in the context of 
employer discrimination, Becker (1971a) showed that with fixed labour supplies, if 
the population proportion of the discriminated group increased, their wage would 
decrease, the wage of the non-discriminated group would increase, and therefore the 
relative wage gap would increase. We have shown that with the variable labour 
supplies this analysis does not hold. Changes in population composition may change 
the wages of the two groups in the same direction, though this is not necessary. The 
reason is that with variable labour supplies, aggregate labour supply across both 
groups changes. The direction of this change depends on which group’s population 
proportion increases and which group has the higher employment rate. If the 
population proportion of the group with the higher employment rate increases, then 
aggregate labour supply increases, putting downward pressure on the wages of both 
groups. The effects of changes in population composition on relative wages however, 
are the same regardless labour supplies being variable or not. The relative wage of the 
group whose population proportion increases, will always fall. 
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 This analysis sheds new light on the theoretical significance of empirical 
analyses of the labour market effects of population composition. The Charles and 
Guryan (2008) finding that higher population proportions of blacks increase the 
black-white wage gap is consistent with long run (as well as short run) labour 
supplies. The Abowd and Killingsworth (1984) finding that higher population 
proportions of blacks have no effect on white employment rates is not consistent with 
fixed but could be consistent with variable labour supplies. With fixed labour supplies 
higher population proportions of blacks would lower black wages and increase white 
wages. The lower black wages would lower black employment rates and the higher 
white wages would raise white employment rates. A higher population proportion of 
blacks would therefore be expected to have a positive effect on the employment rates 
of whites. But with variable labour supplies and conditional on the employment rates, 
the aggregate labour supply effect could cancel out the relative labour supply effect 
and result in no overall effect on white employment rates. 
 We should also note that we assumed that discriminatory preferences were 
constant as population composition changed. Although there is some evidence that 
discriminatory preferences change very slowly overtime (Flabbi, 2010), it would be 
useful to investigate whether the predictions of our analysis can be extended to a 
context where discriminatory preferences change in response to changes in population 
composition. 
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Appendix 
 
Totally differentiating (6) and solving for M
M
dw
dp
 we have: 
/
0
[ ( )] [ ( ) ( ) ]
F Mw w
M M M M
M M
d d
p S w R w g x dx
dp dp
   
/
2
0
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
F M
M
M M M M M
M
w w
M F F F M
M M
M M M M M M
dw
S w p S w
dp
dw w dw w dw
R w g x dx R w g
dp w w dp w dp
  
      
 
/
2
0
1
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F M
F F
M M M
M M M M
w w
M F F
M M M M M
M M
w dw
S w R w g
dw w w dp
dp w w
R w g x dx p S w R w g
w w
  
 
   
  (A.1) 
 
Totally differentiating (7) and solving for M
M
dw
dp
 we have: 
 
1
/
[(1 ) ( )] [ ( ) ( ) ]
F M
F
M F F
M M w w
wd d
p S w R g x dx
dp dp x
    
1
2
/
( ) (1 ) ( )
1 1
[ ( ) ( ) ] ( ) ( )[ ]
F M
F
F F M F F
M
F F F F F M
M
M M M M M Mw w
dw
S w p S w
dp
w dw w dw w dw
R g x dx R w g
x x dp w w dp w dp
    
     
 
1
/
2
1 1
( ) [(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
( ) ( )
F M
M
M
F F F
F F M F F M
M M Mw w
F F
M
M M
dw
dp
dw w w
S w p S w R g x dx R w g
dp x x w w
w w
R w g
w w
 
     

  
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(A.2) 
Equating (A.1) and (A.2) and solving for F
M
dw
dp
 gives (8.1). 
 
 
 
